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7The external environment is an important backdrop in determining economic pol-
icy. Economies with open financial systems and convertible capital accounts are 
sensitive to global market conditions. Even economies with less open financial 
systems are affected. Those with liberalized trade and partially controlled financial 
systems are also influenced—through current account transactions and their finan-
cial repercussions.
In this chapter, we describe three recent phases of global liquidity and discuss 
the policy implications of each for emerging Asia.1 The first phase is the period 
leading up to the 2008/2009 global financial crisis (GFC) and the immediate after-
math of the September 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse. This phase is marked by 
an expansion in global banking and the transmission of financial conditions across 
borders through capital flows—intermediated by the global banking system. The 
concept of core and noncore liabilities is central, as they help define the level of 
risk-taking and the expansion of leverage and bank balance sheets.
The second phase of global liquidity begins roughly in 2010, when several cen-
tral banks in advanced economies began using quantitative easing (QE) and asset 
purchase policies. These affected bond markets—both sovereign and corporate—
and led to much easier conditions in the fixed-income securities market—such 
as higher durations, lower long-term yields, and increased volatility. In emerging 
Asia, the result was the rapid growth of local currency (LCY) bond markets. Real 
money asset managers—rather than banks—are the protagonists in this second 
phase of global liquidity. The search for yield led to an explosion in issuance from 
borrowers previously shunned by markets as being too risky or marginal. Credit 
1
 Broadly, emerging Asia comprises Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC); Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; India; the Republic of Korea; the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR); Malaysia; Myanmar; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; 
Thailand; and Viet Nam. Due to limited data for some economies, figures in this chapter may use 
a subset of the group, but is still referred to as “Emerging Asia.”
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expanded through corporate bond markets open to international investors, both in 
local currencies and in those of advanced economies, particularly the US dollar.
The May 2013 so-called taper tantrum—after the US Federal Reserve (US 
Fed) announced its intention to taper QE—and the financial squall that followed 
in emerging markets is our third phase of global liquidity. Large capital outflows 
from emerging Asia were linked to the impending end of easy money—as central 
banks in advanced economies said they would gradually “normalize” monetary 
policy. While emerging Asia remains much more capable of weathering external 
shocks than it was when the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis struck, the “taper 
tantrum” turmoil exposed several vulnerabilities policy makers had not fully rec-
ognized. Capital flow reversals are certainly not new—they underscore the open-
ness and interdependence of emerging Asian financial sector with global markets. 
Yet, without understanding the nature of capital flows in the first and second 
phases—particularly the growing size and role played by the region’s capital mar-
kets—it is easy to ignore the limitations of standard policy measures. A certain 
policy may be less effective, while the risks it creates can be greater than when the 
region’s capital markets were still in their infancy. Thus, a careful assessment of 
the benefits and costs of each policy is needed.
In the next section, we begin by examining the conceptual building blocks 
needed to understand the three phases of global liquidity. In particular, we review 
the accounting principles based on national income accounting and net capital 
flows that underpin the conventional approach to capital flows. This leads us to the 
gross capital flows—along with bank and corporate consolidated accounts—that 
expose otherwise hidden vulnerabilities. Afterward, we outline the three phases of 
global liquidity and provide an overview of empirical evidence especially as it per-
tains to Asia.
2.1  Conceptual and Measurement Issues
Measurement in international finance traditionally begins with national income 
accounting, with the aim of measuring aggregate output within a well-defined 
“economic territory,” based on the residence principle. An economic entity (such 
as a firm, or more generally an “enterprise”) is resident in an economic territory if 
its principal economic activity is conducted within its territorial boundaries. 
National income accounts further classify the activity into sectors and subsectors 
based on its output. The territorial boundary often coincides with national borders, 
but not always. The principle of measurement is based on residence rather than 
nationality. So even when headquartered elsewhere, a firm is counted as part of the 
aggregate activity of the territory if it conducts business within its boundaries.2
2
 BIS (2012) offers an introduction to the conceptual distinctions in measurement of interna-
tional financial positions.
9Boundaries serve two other roles in international finance given the convenience 
of defining aggregated data. First, the national income boundary is often used in 
aggregate economic models to define the decision-making unit. Thus, residents 
are aggregated into a representative individual that follows an aggregate consump-
tion function. In particular, for example, the balance sheet of the decision-making 
unit is defined by the boundary set by national income accounting. The balance 
of payments and capital flows are defined by reference to increases in assets and 
liabilities of those inside the boundary against those outside. So capital inflows are 
defined as the increase in liabilities of residents to nonresidents, where the meas-
urement is taken in net terms—they represent the increase in liabilities of residents 
to nonresidents net of any increase in claims of residents against nonresidents. As 
the measurement unit is the representative individual within the national income 
boundary, the restriction to net capital flows is quite natural.
Second, in simple economic models, the national income boundary also defines 
the currency area of a particular currency, so the real exchange rate between two 
national income territories is defined as the ratio of the prices between the two 
economic territories. The nominal exchange rate is defined as the price of one cur-
rency relative to another. Thus, implicitly, central bank monetary policy within the 
boundary affects residents within the boundary. To the extent monetary policy has 
spillover effects, either they may be captured through current account and trade 
balances, or they may be captured through capital inflows and outflows as meas-
ured in terms of residence.
To recap, the boundary of an “economic territory” in international economics 
serves three roles: (i) it is the boundary relevant for national income accounting; 
(ii) it defines the decision-making unit, especially its balance sheet; and (iii) it dis-
tinguishes domestic from foreign currency (FCY).
The three roles of the national income boundary is a convention followed in 
simplified economic models—even if the triple coincidence is not a logical con-
sequence of output measurement. However, simple economic models that incor-
porate the triple coincidence were formulated and refined at a time when capital 
flows were not as central as they are today. Nonetheless, the simplification has 
served a useful purpose. Before financial globalization, the triple coincidence in 
the use of economic boundaries was a good approximation. However, with finan-
cial globalization, the triple coincidence has come increasingly under strain. Here, 
we recognize that the traditional role of national income boundary may not work 
as well in understanding today’s global financial markets.
Before examining the impact of global market conditions on emerging Asia, it 
helps to see what happened in advanced economies in the run-up to the GFC and 
how European banks intermediated US dollar funding between savers and borrowers 
in the US.
Two separate periods of global liquidity should be examined. The first—phase 
one—roughly began in 2003 and lasted until the 2008/2009 GFC. Global  banking 
was at its center. Loose financial conditions were transmitted across borders 
through accelerating capital flows using banks. In this context, global bank leverage 
explains comovements in financial conditions across geography and across sectors.
2.1 Conceptual and Measurement Issues
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2.2  First Phase of Global Liquidity
The first phase of global liquidity shows the importance of drawing the correct 
accounting boundaries for measurement in international finance. In particular, the 
US subprime crisis highlights the importance of tracking gross capital flows. Borio 
and Disyatat (2011) have argued that the traditional net capital flow measure as 
given by the current account imbalance may be a potentially misleading measure 
of financial vulnerability. European banks role in intermediating US dollar funding 
was discussed by Shin (2012). Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008, 2010) provide exten-
sive evidence using bank-level data to demonstrate that capital markets reallocate 
funding within global banking organizations.
2.2.1  Round-Trip Bank Flows to the US
During the first phase, European banks played a pivotal role in global financial 
flows. They effectively sustained the shadow banking system in the US by drawing 
on dollar funding in the wholesale market to lend to US residents through the pur-
chase of securitized claims on US borrowers (Fig. 2.1).
Although their presence in the domestic US commercial banking sector was 
small, the shadow banking system made the impact of these European global 
banks on overall credit conditions much larger. This role underscores the impor-
tance of tracking gross capital flows.
European global banks intermediate US dollar funds in the US by drawing on 
wholesale dollar funding—for instance, from US money market funds (MMFs), 
which are then reinvested in securities ultimately backed by US mortgage assets. 
















Fig. 2.1  European banks in the US shadow banking system. Source Shin (2012)
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generated net out and thus do not appear as imbalances in the current account. 
Based on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) banking statistics and infor-
mation on borrowers from US MMF holdings, it is revealed that in the run-up to 
the GFC, MMFs in the US were the base of the shadow banking system, recycling 
wholesale funding to US borrowers via the balance sheet capacity of banks, espe-
cially European banks.
The amount owed by banks to US prime MMFs—based on the top 10 prime 
MMFs—represented $755 billion of the approximate $1.66 trillion total in prime 
MMF assets, classified by nationality of the borrowing bank (Fig. 2.2). US prime 
MMFs nearly bailed out completely from the European Union (EU) periphery as 
of the second half of 2011, as a snapshot of the dollar amounts by nationality of 
borrowing banks on 30 June 2011 makes clear (Fig. 2.3).
How gross flows net out is shown in Fig. 2.4, which plots US gross capital 
flows by category. Positive quantities (and bars) indicate gross capital inflows 
(the increase in claims of foreigners on the US), while negative quantities indicate 
gross capital outflows (the increase in claims of US residents on foreigners).
The gray-shaded bars indicate the increase in claims of official creditors 
on the US. This includes the increase in claims of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and other current account surplus economies. While offi-
cial flows are large, private sector gross flows are larger still. The negative 
bars before 2008 indicate large outflows of capital from the US (principally 
through banks), which then re-enter the economy through purchases of non-
Treasury securities.
We can gain additional insights on the nature of the gross capital flows through 








































Fig. 2.2  Amount owed by banks to US prime money market funds (% of total, by national-
ity of borrowing bank). Source Fitch; and Global Financial Stability Report October 2011, 
International Monetary Fund
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Figure 2.5 plots the assets and liabilities of foreign banks in the US (left panel) 
and their net interoffice assets (right panel). Normally, we would expect net inter-
office assets to be negative, as foreign bank branches act as lending outposts. 
However, the decade between 2001 and 2011 was exceptional, when net interof-
fice assets turned sharply positive, before reversing into negative territory during 
2011. Foreign bank branches and subsidiaries in the US are treated as US resident 
banks in the balance of payments, which are based on residence, not nationality. 
Fig. 2.3  Amount owed by banks to US prime money market funds (as of June 30, 2011, by 
nationality of borrowing bank). Source Fitch; and Global Financial Stability Report October 
2011, International Monetary Fund
Fig. 2.4  US annual capital flows by category. Source Shin (2012); data from US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis
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Therefore, Fig. 2.5 sheds light on the nature of gross capital outflows as shown in 
the balance of payments.
The schematic of the round-trip capital flows through European banks (see 
Fig. 2.1) is useful in understanding gross flows. European banks’ US branches and 
subsidiaries drove the gross capital outflows through the banking sector by raising 
wholesale funding from US MMFs and then shipping them to headquarters.
Gross capital flows to the US through European bank lending via the shadow 
banking system played a pivotal role in influencing US credit conditions in the 
run-up to the subprime crisis. However, since the Eurozone had a roughly bal-
anced current account—the UK was actually a deficit economy—their collective 
net capital flows vis-à-vis the US do not reflect the influence of their banks in set-
ting overall US credit conditions.
The distinction between net and gross flows is a classic theme in international 
finance. But it deserves renewed attention given the new patterns of international 
capital flows. Focusing on the current account and the global savings glut obscures 
the role of gross capital flows and the “global banking glut.”
The role of European banks shows the importance of drawing the right boundaries 
in international finance. Capital flows are traditionally viewed as the financial counter-
part to savings and investment decisions, in line with the narrative of capital flowing 
“downhill” from capital-rich countries with lower rates of return to capital-poor coun-
tries with higher returns. From this perspective, the focus is typically on net capital 
flows, as that is what counts in funding an economy’s borrowing requirements.
However, in the case of European banks intermediating US dollar funding, 
the boundary defined for national income accounting is crossed twice, so that the 
usual net flows do not capture the financial intermediaries engaging in the matu-
rity transformation in the mortgage market. Of course, net capital flows are also 
of concern to policy makers. Current account imbalances have implications for the 
long-run sustainability of the net external asset position.
However, if the objective is to gauge credit conditions and overall financial 
 vulnerability, the current account was of limited use in gauging overall credit  conditions 
in the run-up to the 2008 GFC. Rather than the global savings glut, a more plausible 
culprit for subprime lending in the US was the global banking glut.
Fig. 2.5  Net interoffice assets of foreign banks in the US. Source H8 series on commercial 
banks, Federal Reserve Board
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Two questions are especially pertinent in this context. First, why did banking 
capacity rise so rapidly in Europe? And second, why did European rather than US 
banks expand intermediation between US borrowers and savers? Two likely ele-
ments of the answer to both questions are (i) Europe’s regulatory environment and 
(ii) the advent of the euro. The EU was the jurisdiction that applied Basel II regu-
lations more quickly, while the rapid growth of cross-border banking within the 
Eurozone after 1999 provided fertile conditions for upscaling European banking 
capacity. By contrast, Basel II was implemented more slowly in the US with a cap 
on leverage maintained (at least in the regulated banking sector; US investment 
banks were of course exempt, as shown by the high investment bank  leverage 
ratios, as exemplified by Lehman Brothers).
2.2.2  Banking Sector Flows to the Rest of the World
Figure 2.6 shows the cross-border banking sector claims of BIS-reporting banks 
against counterparties for a diverse group of economies. There is a high degree of 
synchronization of bank flows across the disparate geographies of recipient econo-


















































Fig. 2.6  Claims of BIS-reporting banks on counterparties in selected economies (March 
2003 = 100). Source Bruno and Shin (2012); data from Locational Banking Statistics, Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS)
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Emerging Europe saw the most rapid increase in banking sector inflows during the 
period, followed by countries such as the Republic of Korea and Turkey.
This suggests a global push factor that drove financial conditions globally, run-
ning through banks. It affected domestic financial conditions via the rapid expan-
sion of bank lending funded by capital inflows.
Figure 2.7 depicts the institutional backdrop to the operation of the global bank-
ing system. Banks with access to the US dollar funding market through US MMFs 
channel funding from US financial markets to banks in other parts of the world 
(denoted as regions A, B, and C). The global banks include US-domiciled banks, 
but as discussed above, global banks with European headquarters were particularly 
active in channeling US dollar funding from the US to other parts of the world.
The interconnected nature of the global banking system generates spillover 
effects of financial conditions across borders. The greater ease in raising whole-
sale funding from the center through cheaper US dollar bank funding rates implies 
greater availability of funding to regional banks. This in turn translates into more 
lenient lending conditions to ultimate borrowers in regions A, B, C, etc. The global 
factors motivating the decisions of global banks will determine credit conditions in 
all locations through the institutional structure of the global banking system. The 
spillover effects thus generated mean that more accommodative credit conditions 
associated with global liquidity at the center lead to lower risk-adjusted lending 
rates, inducing firms to apply lower discount rates in their investment decisions. 
For any given fundamental cash flows, lower discount rates and higher net present 
values induce firms to take on more investment projects and greater risk.
Empirically, it has been shown that the leverage of the global banks at the 
center of the system can serve as a summary statistic for the activity of global 
banks in channeling funding from the center to the periphery. In this sense, global 
Fig. 2.7  Structure of the 
global banking system. 
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bank leverage turns out to be a useful proxy for the single global factor that deter-
mines credit availability to all borrowers across all peripheral economies.
Spain’s experience is particularly instructive in how global liquidity converts 
capital flows into domestic credit growth. Total bank credit in Spain was EUR414 
billion in December 1998, shortly before the economy joined the Eurozone. It 
subsequently increased fivefold to nearly EUR2 trillion in 2008 on the eve of the 
GFC (Fig. 2.8). At the time the euro was launched, domestic bank lending in Spain 
could be financed entirely from Spanish residents. But global liquidity changed all 
that, as capital flows and the lending boom fed off one another. At the peak of the 
cycle in 2008, only half of all bank lending in Spain was financed from domestic 
sources. The rest came from capital inflows as foreign banks had rapidly increased 
lending to Spanish banks (Fig. 2.9). This underscores how the Eurozone crisis is 
just part of a larger global picture. Global liquidity mirrors the procyclical nature 
of the global banking system.
Aside from being the world’s most important reserve currency and invoicing 
currency for international trade, the US dollar also underpins the global banking 
system as the funding currency of choice for global banks. The US hosts branches 
of around 160 foreign banks, whose main function is to raise wholesale dollar 
funding in US capital markets and then ship the funds to their respective head 
offices.
Some of these borrowed dollars eventually find their way back to the US to 
finance purchases of mortgage-backed securities and other assets. But many of 
them flow to Europe, Asia, and Latin America where global banks are active local 
lenders. Thus, global banks become carriers for the transmission of cross-border 
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Fig. 2.8  Banking sector credit to nonfinancial borrowers in Spain. Source Bank of Spain
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across regions through portfolio decisions of global banks, so global banks 
become carriers of dollar liquidity across borders. In this way, permissive US 
liquidity condition is transmitted globally, and US monetary policy affects global 
financial conditions.
As noted earlier, the net interoffice assets of foreign banks in the US turned 
sharply positive before reversing during the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2011. 
During 2001–2011, foreign bank offices, rather than being lending outposts, in 
effect became funding sources for the parent bank. The net interoffice position of 
foreign banks in the US, therefore, reflects the extent to which global banks are 
engaged in supplying US dollar funding to other parts of the world. This is a rea-
sonable proxy for the availability of wholesale funding provided to borrowers in a 
capital-recipient economy.
The large net positive interoffice accounts of foreign banks in the US highlight 
the potential for cross-border spillovers of monetary policy effects. Dollar funding 
shipped abroad to bank headquarters will be deployed globally based on portfolio 
allocation decisions that seek to maximize profitability. Thus, permissive liquidity 
conditions in the US dollar wholesale market will be transmitted via the global 
banking system to other parts of the world. Of course, the US dollar takes center 
stage as the currency underpinning the global banking system.
Figure 2.10 shows the FCY assets and liabilities of global banks as tracked by 
the BIS and arranged by currency. The US dollar series shows dollar assets and 
liabilities of banks outside the US, the euro series gives the EUR-denominated 

























































Fig. 2.9  Funding gap among Spanish Banks. Source Bank of Spain
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series reached more than $10 trillion in 2008Q1, briefly exceeding the total assets 
of the US chartered commercial banking sector. Such a risk-taking channel is a 
powerful determinant of leverage, thereby acting as the linchpin in the propagation 
of global liquidity.
2.2.3  Exchange Rates and Leverage
Currency appreciation can fuel capital inflows rather than stem them, as currency 
appreciation strengthens local borrower balance sheets and creates additional slack 
in the lending capacity of banks, thereby stimulating further inflows. This is a dis-
tinctive feature of the risk-taking channel of capital flows through the banking sys-
tem. This argument is developed in Bruno and Shin (2013), who construct a model 
of bank capital flows that track the balance sheet relationships in the global bank-
ing system, rather than follow the national income boundaries as in the conven-
tional approach to capital flows.
The analysis highlights an important policy lesson. In dealing with capi-
tal inflows, a frequently encountered policy prescription is for the authorities of 
the capital-recipient economy to allow the currency to appreciate, engineering 
an expenditure switching effect from tradables to nontradables. However, when 





































































Fig. 2.10  Foreign currency assets and liabilities of BIS-reporting banks (by currency). US 
United States. Source BIS Locational Banking Statistics Table 5A, Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS)
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booms and manage capital inflow pressures. Indeed, policy makers are at risk of 
inadvertently creating an even bigger boom-bust episode.
To grasp this point, it is important to understand the link between currency 
appreciation and the buildup of overall bank leverage. The channel is through 
shifts in the effective credit risk faced by banks who lend to local borrowers that 
may hold a currency mismatch. When the LCY appreciates, local borrower bal-
ance sheets become stronger, resulting in lower credit risk and hence expanded 
bank lending capacity. In this way, currency appreciation leads to greater risk-tak-
ing by banks. This “risk-taking channel” of currency appreciation links exchange 
rates and financial stability.
Consider the example of a foreign bank branch lending in dollars to local 
borrowers who convert the proceeds of the dollar loan into LCY—possibly 
to hedge the currency risk from long-term export receivables, or to engage in 
outright speculation that the LCY will appreciate further. In this situation, an 
initial appreciation of the recipient economy’s currency will strengthen the 
balance sheets of domestic borrowers who borrowed in dollars. As borrowers 
become more creditworthy, bank loan books show less risk, creating additional 
lending capacity. In this way, the initial impulse from an appreciating domes-
tic currency can be amplified. A reinforcing mechanism exists through which 
greater bank risk-taking reduces credit risk, which drives even greater bank 
risk-taking and further appreciation of the domestic currency, thereby complet-
ing the circle.
In this setting, an appreciating domestic currency may not have the presumed 
effect of curtailing capital inflows. The upward phase of the cycle will give the 
appearance of a virtuous circle, in which the mutually reinforcing effect of real 
appreciation and improved balance sheets operate in tandem. Once the cycle turns, 
however, the amplification mechanism operates in reverse, reinforcing the finan-
cial distress of borrowers and the banking sector in general.
The rapid growth of a banking sector fueled by capital inflows and an appre-
ciating currency has been a classic early warning indicator of emerging economy 
crises. Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) conduct an empirical study using data 
from 1973 to 2010 and find that two factors emerge consistently as the most 
robust and significant predictors of financial crises—a rapid increase in leverage 
and sharp real currency appreciation. This holds for both emerging and advanced 
economies and holds throughout the sample period. Schularick and Taylor (2012) 
similarly highlight the role of leverage in financial vulnerability, especially the lev-
erage associated with the banking sector.
Economists have traditionally seen exchange rate appreciation driven by capital 
inflows as self-correcting. Once the currency has appreciated sufficiently, inves-
tors responsible for the capital inflows will recognize the change in the risk–return 
configuration and will therefore slow their investment. Indeed, the standard pre-
scription of the official sector continues to follow a lexicographic ordering in 
which the real exchange rate should be allowed to appreciate sufficiently, and all 
the domestic macroeconomic policy responses should be exhausted before (and as 
a last resort) deploying measures to stem capital inflows directly.
2.2 First Phase of Global Liquidity
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Standard caveats of course accompany the standard prescription. Domestic dis-
tortions could be responsible for both capital inflows and exchange rate apprecia-
tion. For example, foreign investors may be willing to take long positions in the 
domestic economy, in particular in the short run, due to very high domestic inter-
est rates. In this case, there may be a positive correlation between short-term 
inflows and exchange rate appreciation. But the ultimate cause will be a third fac-
tor—the distortion in domestic yields. Problems are exacerbated if monetary 
authorities then attempt to limit appreciation. Anticipated appreciation plus the 
high domestic interest rate will attract additional inflows, dooming any attempt to 
limit appreciation. The implication is that that policy makers should not attempt to 
use capital controls to defend policy inconsistencies, which many times cannot be 
resolved in the short run.3
When bank credit constitutes the bulk of inflows, there is an additional caveat 
to the standard prescription of letting the currency appreciate. The behavior of 
banks and other leveraged institutions is influenced by their capital position and 
perceived risks. Currency appreciation and strong profitability, coupled with tran-
quil economic conditions, can be seen by banks as a cue to further expand lending, 
leading to further capital inflows.
Therefore, the basic philosophical divide is between those who do and do not 
believe that real appreciation eventually chokes off capital inflows due to a reas-
sessment of the attractiveness of the destination currency. Members of the first 
camp (the traditional view) believe that capital flows are driven by textbook port-
folio investors who are driven by fundamental assessments of currency values, 
while members of the second camp believe that capital flows are driven not only 
by assessments of fundamental value but also by the short-term imperatives of 
bank balance sheet capacity—and what Borio and Disyatat (2011) refer to as the 
“excess elasticity” of credit.
For these reasons, macroprudential policy and monetary policy complement 
one another well when global liquidity is operating strongly, as prudential rules 
create sufficient space for domestic monetary policy to operate without the distor-
tionary effects of capital flows.
2.3  Second Phase of Global Liquidity
The second phase of global liquidity appears through sovereign and corporate 
debt markets. Figure 2.11 plots trends in the outstanding amounts of international 
securities issued by governments in developing economies by region as defined 
by the BIS. The total outstanding amounts of international securities in each 
region are normalized to equal unity at the end of 2005Q1. Issuance from govern-
ments in Africa and the Middle East has grown rapidly since 2008, with amounts 
3
 Chile’s experience in the 1990s and Brazil’s more recently highlight this point.
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outstanding more than tripling since 2005Q1. Developing Asia and the Pacific 
and developing Europe also saw rapid increases, although less rapid than Africa. 
Developing Latin America, by contrast, did not see an increase in the amount of 
bonds outstanding.
This provides the contextual backdrop for the numerous international bond 
issues by “frontier” sovereigns in Africa and elsewhere who have only recently 
ventured into the international bond market.
The rapid pace of new issuance is perhaps even starker for nonfinancial corpo-
rate issuers in developing economies (Fig. 2.12). Corporate borrowers in emerg-
ing economies have increased their total international securities borrowing from 
less than $200 billion in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis to $450 billion by 
March 2013. Here, corporate borrowers in Latin America have increased bor-
rowing sharply, in contrast to the subdued borrowing activity of Latin American 
sovereigns.
During the “taper tantrum” of May 2013, one conceptual challenge was to rec-
oncile what appeared to be the small net external debt position of many emerging 
economies with the apparently disproportionate impact of the promise of eventual 
tighter global monetary conditions on their currencies and financial markets.
One piece in the puzzle may be the role played by nonfinancial corporates 
(NFCs) that operate across borders. When corporate activity is conducted in more 
than one territory—as defined by the traditional national income border—measur-
ing exposures at the national income border itself may not capture the strain on 
corporate balance sheets.
Fig. 2.11  Government international debt securities outstanding (2005Q1 = 1). Source Debt 
Securities Statistics, Bank for International Settlements
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A schematic illustration of a multinational corporation borrowing US dollars 
through an overseas subsidiary—either from a global bank or from the corporate 
bond market—helps tell the tale (Fig. 2.13). If the proceeds of the borrowing are 
sent to headquarters through a capital account transaction, the traditional balance 
of payments accounts would show a net capital inflow in the form of greater exter-
nal liabilities of the headquarters to its overseas subsidiary. However, if the multi-
national firm chooses to classify the transaction as part of trade flows in goods and 
Fig. 2.12  Nonfinancial corporate international debt securities outstanding by developing region. 
US United States. Source Debt Securities Statistics, Bank for International Settlements
Fig. 2.13  Nonbank Firm as surrogate intermediary. US United States, A assets, L liabilities. 
Source Authors’ illustration
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services, the vulnerability of the multinational firm to external financial shocks 
may not be captured through the usual residence-based balance of payments 
accounts.
Drawing on the discussion in Azis and Shin (2013) helps illustrate the second 
phase of global liquidity and the importance of emerging market debt securities as 
the channel for emerging market borrowers to gain access to global capital markets.
There has been a clear shift from banks to the bond market since 2010 
(Fig. 2.14). The black and white bars refer to borrowing by emerging market 
banks. The dark gray bars refer to borrowing by nonbanks. The numbers are net 
financing amounts for each year and hence denote increases in amounts outstand-
ing. The white bars shrink rapidly, indicating that capital flows from global banks 
to emerging market banks have slowed to a trickle. Instead, emerging market 
banks have increased issuance in debt securities. For nonbanks, growth in net issu-
ance of international debt securities has been even more dramatic.
The international debt securities numbers are based on a borrower’s nationality 
rather than the usual practice of classifying them by residence (the reason “exter-
nal” is in inverted commas). A borrower’s nationality is defined by the location of 
its headquarters. If an emerging market corporate borrower issues corporate bonds 
through its overseas subsidiary—say in London—the usual balance of payments 
definition (based on residence) would treat the bonds as the liability of the UK 
entity. However, the emerging market company will manage its finances by ref-
erence to its consolidated balance sheet. Thus, it would be important to consider 
the consolidated balance sheet in explaining the behavior of the emerging market 
company, taking account of debt securities issued offshore to reconstruct the total 
assets and liabilities of the decision-making unit.
Offshore debt issuance by emerging market firms has expanded rapidly 
(McCauley et al. 2013). Figure 2.15 plots the international debt securities out-




























Fig. 2.14  Net “external” financing of emerging economies. Source Turner (2014)
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nationality. The difference between the two series reflects the offshore inter-
national debt securities issuance. It was small until after the GFC, but widened 
dramatically thereafter. The scale of the charts shows just how large the outstand-
ing amounts are. Most offshore issuance has been in US dollars, so these corpo-
rates have become much more sensitive to US interest rates and exchange rates 
fluctuations.
This sheds light on what had been a puzzle. As mentioned earlier, the May 
2013 “taper tantrum” and emerging market squall in January 2014 posed the quan-
dary of reconciling small net external debt positions of many emerging economies 
(measured in usual residence terms) with the apparently disproportionate impact 
of the intention and then start of tighter global monetary conditions on their cur-
rencies and financial markets. One piece in the puzzle may be the role of offshore 
debt issuance by firms operating across borders. When corporate activity straddles 
borders, measuring exposures at the border itself may not capture the strain on 
corporate balance sheets.
There are two instances where a firm’s true external exposure may not be captured 
in residence-based statistics (Fig. 2.16). The left panel shows a PRC corporate with 
an office in Hong Kong, China, borrowing US dollars from a Hong Kong, China 
bank, depositing renminbi in the bank’s PRC office as collateral. This transaction 
resembles the London Eurodollar currency swap transaction of the 1960s and 1970s, 
which worked like a straight collateralized loan. The right panel illustrates schemati-
cally an Indian company which borrows in US dollars through its London subsidiary 
and defrays the group’s costs using the dollars, but then accumulates Indian rupees 
at headquarters. The rupees are held as time deposits in a local bank in India. In both 
cases, the firm has engineered a currency mismatch. In effect, the firm has taken on a 
carry trade position, holding cash in LCY financed with dollar liabilities. Intra-group 
accounts would keep track of the subsidiary’s claims on headquarters, but the accu-
mulation of claims may occur through the firm’s day-to-day operations rather than an 
explicit financial transaction classified as capital inflows on the balance of payments.
Thus, the standard external debt measures compiled on a residence basis may 
not fully reflect the true vulnerabilities relevant for explaining market behavior. If 
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Fig. 2.15  International debt securities outstanding (all borrowers, by residence and nationality of 
issuer). Source BIS securities statistics Table 11A and 12A, Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
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holding LCY-denominated financial assets at headquarters, then the company as 
a whole faces a currency mismatch, even if no currency mismatch is captured in 
official net external debt statistics.
Nevertheless, the firm’s fortunes (and hence actions) will be sensitive to cur-
rency movements and thus foreign exchange risk. One motive for taking the carry 
trade position may be to hedge export receivables. Alternatively, the carry trade 
position may be motivated by the prospect of financial gain should the domestic 
currency strengthen against the US dollar. In practice, however, the distinction 
between hedging and speculation may be difficult to draw.
Figure 2.17 plots the total international debt securities outstanding of all bor-
rowers from developing economies as defined by the BIS, plotted by residence 
and by nationality. As before, the difference between the nationality and residence 
series accounts for the offshore issuance of international debt securities. Again, the 
PRC border
India border
PRC corporate Indian corporateHong Kong, China bank
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Fig. 2.17  International debt securities outstanding—developing economies (all borrowers, by 
nationality and residence of borrower). Source BIS securities statistics Table 11A and 12A, Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS)
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difference remained small until after the GFC, but has widened since—$701 bil-
lion at the end of June 2013. Figure 2.18 plots the international debt securities out-
standing only for NFCs, arranged by region. Amounts outstanding increased after 
the crisis for all regions, but especially for Latin America.
Chung et al. (2013) highlight the relevance of monetary aggregates as a poten-
tial indicator of the channel through which offshore issuance of emerging market 
firms may influence domestic financial conditions. For firms that straddle the bor-
der, their financial activities are likely to leave an imprint on the domestic finan-
cial system hosting its headquarters. If the firm issues debt offshore in FCY but 
accumulates liquid financial assets in domestic currency—in the form of claims on 
domestic banks or in the shadow banking system in the headquarter economy—
then keeping track of the firm’s corporate deposits and short-term financial assets 
will give an indirect indication of its overseas financial activities and hence the 
broad financial conditions that prevail in international capital markets. Chung et al. 
(2013) show that external financial conditions are reflected in the monetary aggre-
gates of capital-recipient economies through the increased size of corporate depos-
its, as measured by the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). As the firm 
will borrow more under permissive financial conditions, we would expect to see 
the conjunction of both the firm’s increased indebtedness and greater holdings of 
cash and short-term investments on the consolidated balance sheet. In other words, 
the firm’s financial assets and financial liabilities will increase together, as verified 
in Shin and Zhao (2013). This way, the greater NFC claims on the domestic bank-
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Fig. 2.18  Nonfinancial corporates’ international debt securities outstanding—developing econ-
omies (by nationality of issuer). Source BIS Debt Securities Statistics, Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS)
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globally. Also, to the extent there is a global factor driving global financial condi-
tions, we would expect NFC claims globally to fluctuate in line with global finan-
cial conditions. So measures on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet may be 
a superior indicator of overall credit conditions than tracking the asset side as a 
whole. The advantage of liability measures comes from the role NFCs play “strad-
dling” the border. Their activities are not easily monitored through usual external 
debt measures using locational definitions in balance of payments and national 
income statistics.
2.4  The Case of Emerging Asia
The first and second phases of global liquidity have important implications for 
emerging Asia. For our analysis, we break down capital flows into four types: “for-
eign direct investment” (FDI); “equities” (equity portfolios); “debt” (debt securi-
ties and other debt including derivatives); and “bank” (capital flows intermediated 
by the banking sector). Bank-led and debt-led flows are the most volatile among 
the four types.
Debt-led and bank-led capital flows shifted from negative to positive in five 
Asian economies during the second half of the 2000s (Fig. 2.19).4
Classifying capital flow trends into “surges” (a sharp increase in inflows), 
“stops” (a sharp decrease in inflows), “flight” (a sharp increase in outflows), and 
“retrenchment” (a sharp decrease in outflows), the following pattern emerges for 
the economies cited above:
•	 Surges: equity-led in 2009Q4–2010Q1; debt-led in 2002Q2, 2005Q4, and 
2007Q2–2007Q4; bank-led in 2004Q1 and 2010Q2
•	 Stops: equity-led in 2008Q1–2008Q3; debt-led in 1997Q1–1997Q3 and 
1998Q3; and bank-led in 1997Q4–1998Q2 and 2008Q4–2009Q2
•	 Flight: equity-led in 2007Q4; debt-led in 2005Q4; bank-led in 1999Q3, 
2001Q2, 2002Q4–2004Q3, 2006Q1–2006Q2, 2007Q2–2007Q3, and 2010Q1
•	 Retrenchment: debt-led in 1997Q3–1998Q2 and 2008Q2; bank-led in 
1996Q4–1997Q1, 1998Q3–1998Q4, 2002Q1, 2005Q2, and 2008Q3–2009Q2
For South Asia, the following pattern was observed:
•	 Surges: equity-led in 2003Q4, 2007Q2–2007Q4, and 2010Q1; debt-led in 
2004Q4–2005Q3 and 2006Q4–2007Q1; bank-led in 2003Q2–2003Q3, 2004Q1, 
and 2008Q1
•	 Stops: equity-led in 1998Q2 and 2008Q3–2009Q1; debt-led in 2000Q1, 
2002Q1–2002Q2, and 2009Q2
4
 Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. While Japan is not con-
sidered an emerging Asian economy, we include it here for a bigger data set.
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•	 Flight: equity-led in 2006Q1, 2006Q4–2007Q2, and 2012Q3–2012Q4; debt-led 
in 2000Q4–2001Q2, 2004Q2, and 2008Q4; bank-led in 2004Q1 and 2009Q1
•	 Retrenchment: equity-led in 2011Q2–2011Q4; debt-led in 2000Q1, 
2001Q4–2002Q2, and 2007Q3; bank-led in 1998Q4–1999Q4, 2002Q3, and 
2007Q4–2008Q2
For bank-led flows, deleveraging by European banks contributed to the volatil-
ity. As funding conditions in Europe deteriorated toward the end of 2011, bleak 
economic prospects and doubts over fiscal sustainability undermined the value of 
sovereign and other assets. Bond issuance by banks fell, especially uncollateral-
ized issuance in economies with fiscal problems; outflows due to fund withdrawals 
surged, particularly in Italy and Spain, and exposure to several EU financial insti-
tutions dropped sharply.
Capital flows to Asia intensified before the GFC (Figs. 2.20 and 2.21). These 
flows can be beneficial, but their volatile pattern and procyclicality can also 
act as a channel that transmits the buildup of financial risks and imbalances. 
A recent study examining the procyclicality of financial systems in Asia con-
firms that bank liabilities are highly procyclical, as indicated by the significantly 
positive real gross domestic product (GDP) elasticities, although the degree of 
procyclicality varies across economies. In economies with relatively high real 
GDP elasticities, such as the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, noncore liabili-
ties are more procyclical than core liabilities. Also, noncore liabilities such as 
foreign borrowings tend to be more procyclical during boom periods. Using a 
slightly different approach, in Chap. 4, we also find evidence of procyclicality in 
selected Asian economies.
Fig. 2.19  Gross capital inflows—selected East Asian economies. FDI foreign direct invest-
ment. Note Data include gross capital inflows for Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. Source ADB calculations using data from International Monetary 
Fund Balance of Payments Statistics
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Fig. 2.20  Gross capital inflows and outflows—selected Asian economies. SD standard deviation. 
Notes Data include gross capital inflows and outflows for Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, computed as year-on-year change based on a 4-quarter moving sum. Inflows 
refer to bank flows from other investments on the liabilities side (assigned a positive value); outflows 
refer to bank flows from other investments on the assets side (assigned a negative value). Source ADB 
calculations using data from the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics
Fig. 2.21  Gross capital inflows and outflows in selected South Asian economies. SD stand-
ard deviation. Notes Data for South Asia include India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; periods cov-
ered = 1995Q1–2013Q1 for India and Pakistan and 1995Q1–2011Q4 for Sri Lanka, computed 
as year-on-year change based on a 4-quarter moving sum; inflows refer to bank flows from other 
investments on the liabilities side (assigned a positive value); outflows refer to bank flows from 
other investments on the assets side (assigned a negative value). Source ADB calculations using 
data from the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics
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Regarding US monetary policy, Hahm et al. (2013) show that bank liabilities 
respond to both domestic and US policy interest rates. But there are some differ-
ences across economies. In the Republic of Korea and Singapore, for example, 
bank liabilities tend to increase faster when US federal fund rates are low, which 
indicates that US monetary policy has important spillover effects on bank lever-
aging in emerging Asia. On the impact of interoffice assets of foreign banks in 
the US, bank liabilities in many Asian economies respond positively to US cross-
border interoffice loans and the elasticities are higher for noncore liabilities. The 
impact of global market uncertainty, as measured by the CBOE Volatility Index 
(VIX), seems less significant in Asian economies, and in many cases, the elasticity 
has an opposite sign.
Overall, these suggest that noncore bank liabilities, especially foreign bank 
borrowings, are highly procyclical and constitute an important transmission chan-
nel of global liquidity shocks to Asian economies. In open emerging economies, 
financial cycles can be far different from domestic business cycles due to cross-
border links through noncore funding. The implication is that monetary policy 
alone is insufficient to lean against procyclicality and financial cycles in open 
emerging market economies, and thus, policy makers must also have access to 
macroprudential tools.
Using a panel probit model to analyze the incidence of financial crises in a 
large sample of emerging economies, it has been found that noncore bank liabili-
ties do have explanatory power for subsequent crises (Hahm et al. 2011). This is 
consistent with the analysis based on data of emerging Asia in Chap. 4. The empir-
ical performance of measures for noncore liabilities is encouraging even when 
more traditional measures are included, such as the ratio of credit to GDP. In par-
ticular, banks’ foreign liabilities are a major component of their noncore liabilities 
in many emerging market economies where the domestic wholesale bank funding 
market is not yet able to support rapid bank lending growth.
The overall results from these studies are consistent with the hypothesis that 
noncore bank liabilities matter more in open emerging market economies than in 
relatively closed ones. However, the impact of noncore liabilities appears highly 
nonlinear and heterogeneous across different crisis episodes. Policy makers in 
emerging Asia must take these complex interactions and their effects into consid-
eration when pursuing capital market liberalization. They need to craft a careful 
macroprudential policy framework as a guard against potential risks.
For an economy like the Republic of Korea, where the domestic banks can 
access the global banking system for funding, this makes sense. However, for 
financial systems at an earlier development stage, or where banks are prohibited or 
restricted from accessing the global banking system, the distinction between core 
and noncore liabilities will look different, although the principles from the system-
wide accounting framework will continue to apply (discussed in more detail in 
Chap. 3).
Regardless of system openness, however, a large increase of highly vola-
tile debt-led and bank-led flows pose a difficult challenge for policy makers 
in maintaining macro- and financial stability. Bank-led flows can alter the size 
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and composition of bank balance sheets to the point that risk of a banking crisis 
increases. On the asset side, loan-to-value ratios can rise quickly due to excessive 
credit expansion and other forms of risky investment, while an increase in noncore 
liabilities through bank-led flows can heighten risky behavior and increase bank 
leverage. Bank credit can also be disrupted when an external shock strikes. With a 
stronger currency resulting from capital inflows, banks are willing to take greater 
risks by extending more credit as the balance sheet of borrowers improves.
These risks are particularly important for bank-dependent Asian economies 
with open capital accounts—where bank leverage tends to exceed cyclical norms. 
Bank credit growth in emerging Asia accelerated prior to the GFC (Fig. 2.22). 
Even afterward, growth continued to rise in some economies. This rapid expan-
sion coincided with rising demand for real estate, causing a persistent increase in 
property prices and exposing the region to the risk of a bubble bursting. Credit 
for consumption also surged, which allowed relatively high economic growth amid 
the global economic slowdown.
We investigate the implications for bank behavior by using flow-of-funds (FOF) 
data from five Asian economies—Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; the Philippines; 
Taipei,China; and Thailand. The period under review is divided into pre-GFC 
(2000–2006) and GFC (2007–2011). In the set of charts in Fig. 2.23, the two periods 
are depicted as squares and triangles, respectively. We match the flow of different 
components of liabilities and assets based on the FOF data and estimate the trend 
line in both periods for each economy. In particular, we compare the (i) correlation 
of liabilities with total assets across different types of liabilities and (ii) the correla-
tion of assets with noncore liabilities (or core liabilities in the case of households) 
across different types of assets (Azis and Yarcia 2014). The first aims to capture what 
type of liabilities moves in sync with changes in assets (source of funds); the second 
aims to identify the type of assets noncore liabilities invest in (use of funds).
For example, the Philippine financial sector exhibited a significant change in 
investment behavior between pre-GFC and GFC periods. The preference for 
noncore sources (nondeposits) increased, with the slope doubling, while the slope 
of currency and deposits declined. With growing noncore liabilities, financial sec-
tor investment is more diversified in favor of nonloans, particularly securities and 
equities. In the case of Indonesia, banks have been increasingly seeking funds 
from noncurrency and deposit sources. They continue to allocate the bulk of their 
funds for loans, presumably dominated by credit for consumption, real estate, and 
other nontradables. However, in both economies, the preference for securities and 
nonloan assets rose faster than that for lending.
Like Indonesia, the tendency in Thailand has been to allocate additional funds 
to loans. The corresponding loan slope is close to unity (0.99 and 0.93 during the 
pre-GFC and GFC periods, respectively). In the case of the Republic of Korea, 
the FOF data show a persistently strong tendency toward extending loans. Such a 
strong preference is depicted by a higher slope for loans than for nonloans. A shift 
of preference in favor of raising funds from noncore sources is also observed. The 
noncore share of banks’ liabilities remained high, although it has been declining in 
recent years.
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Fig. 2.22  Credit growth—emerging Asia. Note y-o-y year on year
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It is clear that as banks and other financial institutions expand their liabilities 
using noncore sources, they tend to diversify their asset holdings by allocating the 
additional funds either to loans or to other risky financial assets. As a large por-
tion is directed toward the property market and other forms of consumer credit, 
vulnerabilities multiply. Although the level of noncore liabilities in most econo-
mies has yet to set off alarms, it could threaten macro- and financial stability if left 
unattended.
The attraction for banks holding financial assets has been enhanced by 
improved liquidity in capital markets as foreign funds flocked to the region. As 
foreign investors shun risky holdings such as equities, while at the same time seek 
high risk returns, emerging Asia’s LCY bond market has become especially attrac-
tive. Asia’s safe haven status relative to other developing regions reinforced these 
flows. The yields of traditionally safer US Treasuries and those of emerging mar-
ket debt moved in the same direction after the GFC. Slower global growth expec-
tations pushed emerging Asian LCY bond yields lower in tandem with those in 
advanced economies. This implies that credit risks associated with LCY bonds in 
the region’s emerging markets are significantly lower than in the past.
The share of foreign ownership in some of the region’s LCY bond markets has 
increased, reaching roughly one-third of total bonds outstanding in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and more than 10 % in the Republic of Korea and Singapore (Fig. 2.24). 
Despite this encouraging trend, the relatively small size of emerging Asian LCY 
Fig. 2.22  (continued)
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WK^/dEŽƚĞ͗/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚŝƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚǁŽ͕ ϭϵϵϵͲϮϬϬϲ;ƐƋƵĂƌĞƐͿĂŶĚϮϬϬϳͲϮϬϭϭ;ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐͿ͘ǇсϬ͘ϲϴϳϲǆнϯϮϮϯϴϰZϸсϬ͘ϰϭϯϰǇсϬ͘ϵϵϱϭǆͲ ϰϱϴϵϴZϸсϬ͘ϱϴϰϰ ǇсϬ͘ϰϰϳϴǆнϲϮϯϵϰϱZϸсϬ͘ϱϭϭϯǇсϬ͘ϵϯϮϭǆͲ ϭϵϳϰϲZϸсϬ͘ϴϱϵϮ;ϱϬϬͿϬϱϬϬϭ͕ϬϬϬϭ͕ϱϬϬϮ͕ϬϬϬ;ϱϬϬͿ Ϭ ϱϬϬ ϭ͕ϬϬϬ ϭ͕ϱϬϬ Ϯ͕ϬϬϬŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƐƐĞƚƐ ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶEŽŶͲΘ>ŝĂďŝůŝƟĞƐFinancial Sector Assets, Thailand (2000 2011)(in billion baht) EKEͲ>KE>KEEŽƚĞ͗/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚŝƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚǁŽ͕ϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϬϲ;ƐƋƵĂƌĞƐͿĂŶĚϮϬϬϳͲϮϬϭϭ;ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐͿ͘ ǇсϬ͘ϱϮϮϲǆͲ ϭϭϵϰϴϮZϸсϬ͘ϴϳϵϰǇсϬ͘ϭϱϳϲǆнϮϴϰϴϲϮZϸсϬ͘ϱϴϱϲ ǇсϬ͘ϲϱϯϭǆͲ ϯϭϱϴϮϵZϸсϬ͘ϵϬϭϮǇсϬ͘ϯϱϵǆнϭϬϲϱϲϭZϸсϬ͘ϳϲϳϲ;ϲϬϬͿ;ϰϬϬͿ;ϮϬϬͿϬϮϬϬϰϬϬϲϬϬϴϬϬϭ͕ϬϬϬϭ͕ϮϬϬϭ͕ϰϬϬϭ͕ϲϬϬ;ϭ͕ϬϬϬͿ Ϭ ϭ͕ϬϬϬ Ϯ͕ϬϬϬ ϯ͕ϬϬϬŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ>ŝĂďŝůŝƟĞƐ ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƐƐĞƚƐFinancial Sector Liabilities, Thailand (2000 2011)(in billion baht) EKEͲhZZEzEWK^/dhZZEzEWK^/dEŽƚĞ͗/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚŝƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚǁŽ͕ϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϬϲ;ƐƋƵĂƌĞƐͿĂŶĚϮϬϬϳͲϮϬϭϭ;ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐͿ͘ǇсϬ͘ϳϭϯǆнϯϯϯϳϵZϸсϬ͘ϳϴϵ ǇсϬ͘ϱϱϭǆнϭϲϱϭϯZϸсϬ͘ϱϵϬϰǇсϬ͘ϮϭϯǆнϭϱϮϲϰϮZϸсϬ͘ϭϵϬϯǇсϬ͘ϱϯϰϯǆнϯϱϳϭϬZϸсϬ͘ϯϰϱϳ;ϭϬϬͿ;ϱϬͿϬϱϬϭϬϬϭϱϬϮϬϬϮϱϬ Ϭ ϱϬ ϭϬϬ ϭϱϬ ϮϬϬ ϮϱϬ ϯϬϬŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƐƐĞƚƐ ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶEŽŶͲΘ>ŝĂďŝůŝƟĞƐFinancial Sector Assets,  Rep. of Korea (2000 2011)(in trillion won) EKEͲ>KE>KEEŽƚĞ͗/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚŝƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚǁŽ͕ϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϬϲ;ƐƋƵĂƌĞƐͿĂŶĚϮϬϬϳͲϮϬϭϭ;ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐͿ͘ ǇсϬ͘ϲϲϲϵǆͲ ϭϲϬϬϰZϸсϬ͘ϴϰϮϵǇсϬ͘ϯϮϬϱǆнϭϮϵϲϲZϸсϬ͘ϱϰϲϳǇсϭ͘ϭϱϮϭǆͲ ϮϬϯϰϴϵZϸсϬ͘ϴϲϭǇсͲϬ͘ϬϲϰϱǆнϭϲϰϮϯϰZϸсϬ͘ϬϭϳϴϬϱϬϭϬϬϭϱϬϮϬϬϮϱϬϯϬϬ Ϭ ϭϬϬ ϮϬϬ ϯϬϬ ϰϬϬ ϱϬϬŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ>ŝĂďŝůŝƟĞƐ ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƐƐĞƚƐFinancial Sector Liabilities, Rep. of Korea (2000 2011)(in trillion won) EKEͲhZZEzEWK^/dhZZEzEWK^/dEŽƚĞ͗/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚŝƐĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚǁŽ͕ϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϬϲ;ƐƋƵĂƌĞƐͿĂŶĚϮϬϬϳͲϮϬϭϭ;ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞƐͿ͘
Fig. 2.23  Bank behavior—selected emerging Asian economies. Source Flow-of-funds (FOF) 
data from national sources
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bond markets and their limited liquidity make these markets sensitive to foreign 
withdrawals. The resulting volatility can hurt market liquidity and reduce the 
region’s attractiveness to bond investors—as it directly affects investor percep-
tions of the collateral value of emerging Asian LCY bonds. A recent study by Azis 
et al. (2013) shows how some Asian markets were significantly affected by US 
and European bond market volatility associated with both the Lehman failure and 
Eurozone crisis.
In short, the global flows that fueled capital market liquidity in emerging Asia 
(second phase) clearly affected the region’s financial sector, which is the larg-
est holder of LCY bonds. And with ample liquidity from noncore liabilities (first 
phase), banks expanded not just lending but their financial assets as well, includ-
ing LCY sovereign bonds. This has some bearing on the implications for available 
policy choices.
2.5  Third Phase and Onward
The first and second phases of global liquidity set the stage for a new episode, one 
that could define a distinct third phase. The Asian experience of capital flow rever-
sals discussed above is particularly relevant in establishing this third phase. The 
vulnerability caused by bank-led flows through noncore liabilities in the first phase 
is associated with procyclicality—where a bank’s health can deteriorate despite 
the structural improvements since the Asian financial crisis. While the credit cycle 
can therefore still be impinged, it is the vulnerability caused by debt-led flows that 



















































Fig. 2.24  Share of foreign ownership—selected emerging Asian local currency bond markets. 
Source ADB calculations
2.4 The Case of Emerging Asia
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Debt-led flows raised the level of foreign ownership in emerging Asian capi-
tal markets, enhancing market liquidity and attracting amply liquid banks to hold 
financial assets on their balance sheets. When a shock causes sporadic and sudden 
outflows, this link between banks and capital markets can weaken bank balance 
sheets when asset prices fall.
In this way, the second phase of global liquidity has led to a combination of 
forces that increase the vulnerability of emerging economies to a reversal of per-
missive financial conditions. There are three elements:
i.  Yields on emerging market LCY debt securities have fallen in tandem with 
those in more mature markets and have shown increasing tendency to move in 
sync with bonds in advanced economies (Miyajima et al. 2012, Turner 2014).
ii.  Offshore FCY corporate bond issuance has created currency mismatches on 
the consolidated balance sheets of emerging market firms. Accompanying this 
offshore issuance has been growth in corporate deposits in the domestic bank-
ing system that becomes vulnerable to withdrawals in the case of corporate 
distress.
iii. The growing stock of emerging market corporate debt securities has been 
absorbed by asset managers—whose main reason for buying them has been 
the perception of stronger economic fundamentals of emerging markets.
All three elements ignited during mid-2013, placing financial markets in emerging 
economies under severe stress.
The shock that led to the capital outflows was the 22 May 2013 remarks by 
the US Fed Chairman on the possibility of QE tapering and the subsequent sug-
gestion that the tapering could start in late 2013 and be completed by mid-2014. 
The remarks sparked a sell-off in bond markets in the US, with bond yields rising 
from 2.13 % at the beginning of June to 2.74 % on 8 July. Interest rates eased a 
bit following the US Fed’s clarification that the start of tapering was not imminent 
and would depend on economic conditions. But the bond market sell-off spreads 
to emerging markets nonetheless, with an immediate impact of rising bond yields, 
higher interbank rates, and depreciating currencies—albeit the impacts were not 
felt evenly across all economies.
From May to August 2013, capital outflows from emerging Asia’s top 10 
economies were estimated at $86 billion, half of which comprised outflows from 
the PRC. This is still relatively small compared with the $2.1 trillion of inflows 
between November 2008 and April 2013, an estimate based on foreign exchange 
reserves data. Between June and August, foreign investors withdrew roughly 
$19 billion from Asian LCY bond markets. Given the small market size in some 
economies, the impact was inevitable and significant, especially where the funda-
mentals were weak (e.g., those with high fiscal and current account deficits). India 
and Indonesia are notable examples where policy choices became more limited.
In 2013Q2, while there were four emerging Asian economies with cur-
rent account deficits, only India and Indonesia also had fiscal deficits in 2012 
(Table 2.1). Among the 11 economies listed, they also had the two lowest ratios 
of foreign exchange reserves to GDP and the two highest rates of inflation. As risk 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38 2 The Three Phases of Global Liquidity
perceptions for both economies increased, they endured the largest capital out-
flows and sharpest currency depreciations (Fig. 2.25).
Between end-May and end-July, government bond yields in Indonesia rose 
dramatically—from 145 basis points (bps) and 250 bps—shifting the yield curve 
upward while simultaneously flattening it. This was expected with the capital 
outflows and given the large share of foreign ownership in their LCY bond mar-
kets. By June, foreign investors had become net sellers, with capital outflows of 
IDR15.76 trillion during the month. Bond market sentiment was also dampened 
by warnings from rating agencies of a possible sovereign downgrade. These fac-
tors’ cumulative effect was to raise borrowing costs, which may have postponed 
new private sector investments using local markets.
With banks the biggest bondholders in Indonesia, bond market vulnerabilities 
can damage bank balance sheets (Fig. 2.26). To the extent LCY bond markets are 
Fig. 2.25  Exchange 
rate indexes (January 2, 
2013 = 100). PRC People’s 
Republic of China. Notes  
1. Spot market exchange rates 
are quoted as $ per unit of 
local currency. 2. An increase 
means appreciation;  
a decrease means 
depreciation. Source ADB 
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preferred—as they provide a more stable source of long-term funding without the risk 
of currency mismatch—the trend was not good. However, with its rising fiscal deficit, 
there was no choice for the Indonesian government but to continue issuing bonds.
Issuing FCY bonds has become more difficult and expensive as well. Issuance 
of FCY bonds in emerging Asia declined dramatically in June 2013 and only 
slightly recovered in subsequent months (Fig. 2.27). Although the figure leaves out 
India, the world’s third largest economy, the same thing happened—Indian firms’ 
overseas bond sales slowed significantly.5 Only one Indian company (Indian Oil) 
managed to sell a US$-denominated bond during the period after 22 May when 
the US Fed hinted at QE tapering.
5


























Fig. 2.26  Outstanding bond holdings by investor versus private domestic debt issuance in 
Indonesia. Source AsiaBondsOnline
Fig. 2.27  G3 currency bond 
issuance. G3 Eurozone, 
Japan, US. Note G3 currency 
bond issuance covers data 
for the People’s Republic of 
China; Hong Kong, China; 
Indonesia; the Republic 
of Korea; Malaysia; the 
Philippines; Singapore; 
Thailand; and Viet Nam. 
Source ADB calculations 
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For emerging Asia as a whole, FCY bond issuance fell from $81 billion in the 
first 5 months of 2013 to just $7.5 billion in June and July. The high-yield market 
was particularly hard hit. Given that global investors were hunting for Asia’s high-
yield bonds during the second phase of global liquidity, it was a dramatic turna-
round in terms of capital flows.
Even economies with relatively sound fundamentals experienced capital out-
flows—US market risks were perceived to be less significant. With the exception 
of the renminbi and the Philippine peso, the exchange rate in all emerging Asian 
economies depreciated against the US dollar following the 22 May announcement. 
Bond markets in Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; the Philippines; and Singapore—
markets traditionally viewed as safe havens due to their strong economic funda-
mentals—all saw a rise in 10-year bond yields. Bond yields in the PRC and Viet 
Nam were the only exceptions as they remained unaffected by the sell-off.
Equity market investors—prone to “buying the rumor and selling the news”—
also began to bail. Asset price swings reflect the region’s thin, illiquid equity markets 
as prices jumped, especially in interest-rate-sensitive sectors (Fig. 2.28). Table 2.2 
summarizes the direction and magnitude of changes in bond yields, credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads, equity markets, and exchange rates since 22 May.
With rising capital outflows, weakening capital markets, and depreciated 
exchange rates, market confidence fell—indicated by rising CDS spreads, which 
increased almost 60 bps in Indonesia from the beginning of April to end-July. 
The Indian CDS spread experienced an even steeper increase following the QE 
tapering announcement. Consistent with other vulnerability indicators, India 
and Indonesia (along with Viet Nam) sit at the top of emerging Asian economies 
with the highest CDS spreads (Fig. 2.29). When it comes to market confidence 
and perceptions, however, economic fundamentals may take the back seat. CDS 
spreads in the PRC, Malaysia, and the Philippines also increased despite their bet-
ter fundamentals.
In sum, the third phase of global liquidity is a story about capital flow reversals 
triggered by the May 2013 US Fed announcement, leading to elevated risk percep-
tions toward emerging Asian markets. Although economies with weak fundamen-
tals were hit hardest, outflows occurred across the board. The repercussions for 
capital markets and exchange rates, however, were varied.
When global financial conditions eventually tighten—as the US Fed begins to 
raise rates—vulnerabilities will likely impact market behavior yet again. Given the 
elements underpinning the second phase of global liquidity, the crisis dynamics in 
the emerging economies would then have the following elements:
Step 1. Steepening of the LCY yield curve
Step 2. Currency depreciation, corporate distress, and runs of wholesale corpo-
rate deposits from the domestic banking system
Step 3. Decline in corporate capital expenditure directly feeding into slowing 
economic growth
Step 4. Asset managers cutting back positions in emerging market corporate 
bonds, citing the slower growth, and
Step 5. A return to Step 1, completing the loop
41
The distress dynamics sketched above holds some unfamiliar elements. We normally 
invoke either leverage or maturity mismatches when explaining crises—with the usual 
protagonists in the crisis narrative banks or other financial intermediaries. In contrast, 
in this pending scenario, asset managers are at its heart. We find this unsettling, as 
long- or hold-to-maturity investors are meant to be benign, not add to market vulner-
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Fig. 2.28  Stock Price Index (January 2, 2013 = 100), Notes 1. For the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), daily stock price indexes are the combined Shanghai and Shenzhen composites, 
weighted by market capitalization in US dollars. 2. Data as of September 12, 2013. Source ADB 
calculations using data from Bloomberg
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However, the distinction between leveraged institutions and these long-
term investors matters less if they share the same tendency toward procyclical-
ity. Asset managers are answerable to the trustees of the fund that gives them 
their mandate. In turn, the trustees are themselves agents vis-à-vis the ultimate 
Table 2.2  Changes in bond markets, CDS spreads, equity markets, and exchange rates—since 
May 22, 2013
– not available, bps basis points, FX foreign exchange
Notes
1. Data reflect changes between May 22, 2013, and September 12, 2013
2. For Emerging Asia, a positive (negative) value for the FX rate indicates the appreciation 
(depreciation) of the local currency against the US dollar
3. For European markets, a positive (negative) value for the FX rate indicates the depreciation 
(appreciation) of the local currency against the US dollar. Source Bloomberg LP, Institute of 










Equity index (%) FX rate (%)
Major advanced economies
US 20 87 0 1.7 –
UK 15 104 (7) (3.7) (5.0)
Japan (1) (16) (1) (6.9) 3.5





90 70 11 (2.0) 0.2
Hong Kong, 
China
21 127 9 (1.3) 0.1
India 169 133 150 (1.4) (14.5)
Indonesia 315 290 110 (16.3) (16.2)
Republic of 
Korea
19 60 4 0.5 2.6
Malaysia 29 67 47 (0.6) (8.5)
Philippines 49 70 35 (16.1) (6.4)
Singapore (3) 100 0 (9.6) (0.1)
Taipei,China 16 41 6 (2.1) 0.3
Thailand 26 104 42 (14.3) (6.0)
Viet Nam 100 (25) – (5.3) (0.5)
Select European markets
Greece 2 99 0 (7.7) (3.4)
Ireland 40 56 18 4.1 (3.4)
Italy 65 61 6 (0.1) (3.4)
Portugal 219 188 247 0.6 (3.4)
Spain 18 28 23 5.5 (3.4)
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beneficiaries. In this way, asset managers lie at the end of a chain of princi-
pal–agent relationships that may induce restrictions on their discretion in select-
ing their portfolio. Frequently, trading restrictions are based on measures of 
risk used by banks and other leveraged players. As such, their behavior could 
show the same type of procyclical risk-taking that banks are well known for. 
The uncomfortable lesson is that asset managers may not conform to the text-
book picture of long-term investors, but instead may have much more in com-
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Fig. 2.29  Credit default swap spreads—selected Asian economies. PRC People’s Republic of 
China. Note Data as of September 12, 2013. Source Datastream
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